Insurance -- Employee Welfare Plans by Tompkins, George N.
Notre Dame Law Review
Volume 31 | Issue 2 Article 7
3-1-1956
Insurance -- Employee Welfare Plans
George N. Tompkins
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Law Review by an
authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
George N. Tompkins, Insurance -- Employee Welfare Plans, 31 Notre Dame L. Rev. 276 (1956).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndlr/vol31/iss2/7
brought to you by COREView metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk





The increasing number of employee welfare plans, many of
which are appearing in collective bargaining agreements, is
causing considerable concern among insurance companies and
the state officials charged with the duty of supervising insurance.
This concern arises out of the fact that these welfare plans are
not subjected in any substantial degree to government regulation,
notwithstanding the plans are in all material respects similar to
the group insurance plans which are available to employers and
employees through licensed insurance companies.
The typical employee welfare plan is arrived at through ne-
gotiations between an employer and the representatives of his
employees, and is generally incorporated in the collective bargain-
ing agreement as a part of it. Thus, from the outset it must be
kept in mind that these plans and their incidents are contractual
in nature. The usual benefits provided under the plan for an em-
ployee and his family consist of death, hospital and surgical
benefits. Some plans include in addition cash disability benefits
and other medical benefits.'
In respect of these plans the employer either agrees to pro-
vide certain benefits or to contribute to a jointly trusteed fund
on the basis of some agreed-upon formula, such as, a percentage
of the total payroll, a fixed amount per employee, or a certain
amount for each hour worked. Employee money contributions
when required by the agreement are made by means of payroll
deductions and union dues and assessments.
When the employer agrees to provide certain benefits this may
be done either by purchasing insurance from a licensed insurance
company or by making payments directly to the employees. When
a jointly trusteed fund is created for the purpose of providing
the agreed benefits, the trustees may likewise provide benefits
by purchasing insurance or by paying the benefits directly to the
employees. It is only with the type of plan under which either
1 Some of these plans also contain a provision for "pensions." As to
this provision, no extended discussion appears to be necessary. Putting
to one side the traditional voluntary pension paid by an employer to a
retired employee and considering only the modern contractual plan calling
for periodic payments conditioned upon the continuation of life, it seems
clear that such a plan constitutes the writing of annuities.
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-the employer or the trustees pay benefits directly to the em-
ployees that this discussion is concerned. Such a plan is com-
monly referred to as "self-insurance."
Statutes regulating the business of insurance have been
,enacted in all of the forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia.2 The question whether the plans under discussion in-
volve insurance within the meaning of these statutes has never
been squarely presented to the courts. The purpose of this dis-
,cussion is to attempt to propose an answer by examining the
statutory definitions of "insurance," "insurance contract" and
"insurance business," and also the judicial definitions of these
terms. It goes without saying that if the plans under discussion
.are insurance, then the statutory regulations governing the in-
surance business are applicable.
Statutory Material
The statutes regulating insurance are generally very detailed
in their provisions. However, the legislatures of a number of
states have altogether neglected to define just what is meant by
"insurance," "insurance contract" or "insurance business" within
their statutes.3 The statutes of 25 states define the meaning of
"insurance" or an "insurance contract" within the provisions of
their insurance codes.- Basically each one of these provisions
2 See VANCE, INsuRANcE 36-51 (3d ed. 1951).
3 Anx. STAT. ANN. § 66-101 (1947); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 6024 (1949); DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 101 (1953); D. C. CODE: A-W .§ 35-101 (1951); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 625.01 (1944); GA. CODE ANN. § 56-101 (1953); ILL. AIN. STAT. c. 73,
§ 614 (Smith-Hurd 1940); IOWA CODE ANN. § 505.1 (1949); EAL. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 40-101 (1949); MifcH. STAT. ANN. § 24.1 (1943); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
374.010 (1952); N. H. STAT. ANN. § 400.1 (1955); N.J. STAT. ANNx. § 17:17-1
(Supp. 1954); N.M. STAT. Axw. § 58-1-1 (1953); OHio REV. CODE ANx. § 3901.01
(Page 1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1 (1954); R. I. GEN. LAWS c. 156, §
1! (1938); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1.01 (1952); VT. REv. STAT. § 9023 (1947);
W. VA. CODE AiNN. § 3274 (1955); Wis. STAT. § 200.01 (1953); Wyo. Coip. STAT.
ANN. § 52-101 (1945). The statutes of Maryland and Virginia provide defini-
tions of "insurance business," or "business of insurance," but the definitions
are defective because they are cast in terms of any company issuing an
"insurance contract" and this term is not defined in the statute. VID. AwN.
CODE art. 48A § 1 (1951); VA. CODE § 38.1-1 (10) (1930).
4 ALA. CODE tit. 28, § 2 (1940); ARiz. CODE ANN. § 61-1302 (Supp. 1954);
CAL. INS. CODE ANx. § 22 (Deering 1950); COLO. REv. STAT. AN. § 72-1-1
(1953); IDAHo CODE ANN. § 41-201(1) (Supp. 1955); IND. ANN. STAT. § 39-
3203(a) (Burns 1952); Ky. REv. STAT. AwN. § 304.002 (Supp. 1953); LA. REv.
STAT. ANNm. § 22:5(1) (1950); ME. REv. STAT. c. 60, § 1 (1954); MASS. ANN.
LAWs c.175, § 2 (1948); Mm.x. STAT. ANN. § 60.02(3) (1945); Miss. CODE ANN.
§ 5633 (1942); MoNr. REv. CODES ANN. § 40-101 (1947); NEB. REv. STAT. §
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requires the presence of the same elements in a contract before
it will be regarded as a contract of insurance, namely, an agree-
ment, whereby one party agrees, for a valid consideration, to
indemnify the other party against certain specified losses, oc-
casioned by some fortuitous event. Perhaps the most compre-
hensive and extensive statutory definition of an insurance con-
tract is that given in the New York Insurance Law, where it is
provided that the term "insurance contract" shall:
. . . be deemed to include any agreement or other transaction
whereby one party, herein called the insurer, is obligated to con-
fer benefit of pecuniary value upon another party, herein called
the insured or the beneficiary, dependent upon the happening of a
fortuitous event in which the insured or beneficiary has, or is
expected to have at the time of such happening, a material interest
which will be adversely affected by the happening of such event.5
Applying this definition6 to the type of plan under considera-
tion, the conclusion is inescapable that the plan is insurance or
an insurance contract. The plan contains all the elements con-
sidered essential to the existence of an insurance contract. There
is an agreement as to the terms of the plan which may be in-
cluded as one part of the over-all collective bargaining agree-
ment or may exist apart from it. This agreement contains an
undertaking to indemnify the employees against certain losses
occasioned by specified fortuitous events. This promise of in-
demnification is supported by a valid consideration. Even where
the plan provides that the employer shall bear the entire cost of
the plan a valid consideration on the part of the employees can
be found in the services rendered. Lastly, the events which give
an employee a right to receive the benefits from the fund are
fortuitous, i.e., substantially beyond the control of either party.
The events which are usually regarded as fortuitous are death,
accidents, illness and other similar unforeseen occurrences. That
an employee has a material interest which is adversely affected
by the happening of some such event is self-evident-his con-
tinued health or that of his family. Thus it cannot be denied that
I continued
44-102 (Reissue 1952); NEv. Coap. LAWS § 3656.10(1) (Supp. 1941); N.Y. INs.
LAW § 41(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-3 (1950); N.D. Rnv. CODE § 26-0201
(1943); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 2 (1953); ORE. REV. STAT. § 736.005(1)
(1953); S.C. CODE § 37-3 (1952); S.D. CODE § 31-0101(1) (1939); TENN.
CODE AwN. § 56-1101 (1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-1-7 (1953); WAsH. REV.
CODE § 48.01.040 (1951).
5 N.Y. INs. LAW § 41(1).




an employee welfare plan such as that being considered here
meets every requirement of the statutory definitions of "in-
surance" or "insurance contract." Are not these plans then sub-
ject to the same statutory regulation and control as licensed in-
surance companies?
Some state legislatures have seen fit to provide in their in-
surance statutes a provision defining the meaning of "trans-
action" of insurance, or "doing an insurance business" within
the insurance codesZ The provision in the California code" is as
follows:
"Transact" as applied to insurance includes any of the following:
(a) Solicitation.
(b) Negotiations preliminary to execution.
(c) Execution of a contract of insurance.
(d) Transaction of matters subsequent to execution of the contract
and arising out of it.
These are the four basic requirements of all the provisions of
this nature.9 It is important to note that any of these four activi-
ties constitutes the transaction of insurance. Referring back to
the welfare plans mentioned earlier,' 0 it is apparent that the
establishment of one of these plans is the direct result of negotia-
tions between the employer and the union. That the executed
plan is an insurance contract has already been shown." So long
as the welfare plan remains in existence there will always be
some matters "arising out of it," such as, payment by the em-
ployees of their contributions where called for, payment of con-
tributions by the employer, and payment of benefits. Thus the
plan contains not only one but most of the basic requirements of
an insurance transaction within the statutory meanings of that
term. How then can it be denied that this type of employee welfare
plan is transacting insurance and carrying on an insurance busi-
ness?
On the basis of the discussion to this point, certain conclusions
can be drawn. The type of employee welfare plans being con-
sidered here are established by contractual arrangement and
7 AR=z. CODE ANN. § 61-1305 (Supp. 1954); CAL. INS. CODE AiNN. § 35
(Deering 1950); MD. Amx. CODE art. 48A, § 1 (1951); NEv. Coais. LAws §§
3656.02 (j), 3656.10 (3) (Supp. 1941); N.Y. INS. LAw § 41 (3); UTAH CODE
Ax. § 31-1-11 (1953); VA. CODE AwN. § 38.1-1(10) (1950); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 48.01.060 (1951).
8 CAL. INS. CODE Aim. § 35 (Deering 1950).
9 See note 7 supra.
30 See text at page 276 supra.
13 See text at page 278 supra.
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this contract is an "insurance contract" within the statutory
definitions of that term. These plans in agreeing to provide, and
providing, certain benefits to employees, for a valid considera-
tion, and upon the happening of fortuitous events, are transacting
insurance and carrying on an insurance business. These plans.
therefore are subject to the statutes regulating insurance in the
absence of a specific exemption.'
2
3- The correctness of this position is borne out by the fact that in
Massachusetts there has been enacted a law (Chap. 636, Laws 1955) which,
while it only exempts from the operation of the insurance law welfare trust
funds jointly administered under the provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act,
nevertheless presupposes that the use of such funds for the furnishing of
benefits in the same way as the plans under consideration without the
statutory exemption would be a violation of the insurance law of Mas-
sachusetts. The form of this statutory exemption, referring as it does merely
to the trusts themselves, in terms of its reach and its real effect is rather
ambiguous.
Likewise, legislation was introduced both in Ohio and New York (Ohio,
H. B. 506; N.Y. S. Int. 1924, Assem. Int. 1983 (1949), N.Y. S. Int. 308,
Assem. Int. 280 (1950), N.Y. S. Int. 350 (1951)), seeking a similar result but
not confined to Taft-Hartley trusts. These pieces of legislation, whose in-
troduction obviously carried the same implications as the exemption pro-
vision enacted in Massachusetts, failed of enactment.
Similarly an action was brought recently (Greene v. Holz, unofficially
reported in N.Y.L.J., Dec. 5, 1955) in the New York Supreme Court in New
York County, by the trustees of a Taft-Hartley jointly administered trust
fmd, for the benefit of members of the National Maritime Union and thier
families, against the Superintendent of Insurance of New York for a
declaratory judgment that the Superintendent should issue a ruling to-
the effect that, if the trustees ceased to furnish the benefits through a
licensed carrier and did it on a self-operated basis, a violation of the New
York Insurance Law would not be involved. The complaint in that action
indicated that its genesis lay in the fact that counsel for the union had
serious doubts as to whether the trustees could proceed in this manner with-
out violating the Insurance Law. In fact, the complaint reveals that in
their communication of September 6, 1955 to the Superintendent, co-counsel
for the trustees said:
"At a meeting of the Board of Trustees of the NMU Pension and
Welfare Plan, held on August 31, 1955, it was unanimously decided
that the best interests of the beneficiaries of the fund would be
served by changing by January 1, 1956 from an insured to a self-
administered program, covering the welfare benefits of the Plan.
Recognizing that some legal questions may preclude this action, co-
counsel were directed to take all measures necessary to resolve
any doubts on this score." (Emphasis added). Plaintiff's complaint,
p. 5, Greene v. Holz, supra.
In that action the trustees also urged the view that in any event Congress,
in enacting the amendment of section 186 of the Labor-Management Re-
lations Act in 1947 to permit jointly administered employee welfare trust
funds, had pre-empted the field. The action of the trustees (opinion of Mr.
Justice Eder, Supreme Court, New York County, appearing in the New
York Law Journal of December 5, 1955) was dismissed as premature, as
seeking an advisory opinion, and on the ground that the court, in any
event, should decline to take jurisdiction.
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Let us now proceed to examine the decisions of the courts to
determine what the courts understand by an "insurance con-
tract" and the "doing of an insurance business," especially in
those states where the legislatures have left it to the courts to
define these terms.
Case Material
As indicated earlier, no court has decided whether the type
of plan being considered here is insurance.' 3 Of necessity, there-
fore, the following examination of court decisions will be to de-
termine what the courts regard as insurance, and what activity
they consider to be the doing of an insurance business. It is
fundamental thit, in construing an agreement to determine
whether it is an insurance contract, the determination will be
made from the agreement considered as a whole and from the
"... conduct of the parties as a practical interpretation of the
contract."' 4
Various definitions of an "insurance contract" and "insurance"
have been enunciated by the courts but, like their statutory
counterparts, they are basically the same. "Insurance" has been
defined as a contract of indemnity against contingent loss,15 an
agreement to indemnify against loss'6 and a contract where for a
stipulated consideration one party undertakes to compensate the
other against loss by certain contingencies or perils.' 7 New Jer-
sey has adopted the definition of insurance contained in the Mas-
'3 A lower court in New York has decided that union welfare funds in
the hands of joint trustees, to be administered solely by them in ac-
cordance with a collective bargaining agreement, are the funds of the
trustees and the records of these funds are the trustees' records. Hence
the New York State Superintendent of Insurance was authorized to examine
these records for the purpose of determining whether an insurance business
was being conducted by the trustees. The union officials contended that
since unions are exempt from the insurance laws of New York, N. Y. INs.
LAW § 466, the records of the welfare funds could not be reached by the
Superintendent. However, the court held that the funds and the records
were separate and independent from the union, and the exemption pro-
vided in the insurance law for the union did not extend to these records.
Application of Townsend, 206 Misc. 619, 130 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
.4 National Colored Aid Soc'y v. State ex Yel. Wilson, 208 Ind. 380, 196
N.E. 240, 246 (1935) (dictum).
'5 Brock v. Hardie, 114 Fla. 670, 154 So. 690, 697 (1934) (dictum); Nash
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 272 Mich. 680, 262 N.W. 441, 442 (1935) (dictum).
16 Wolfe v. Breman, 69 Ga. App. 813, 26 S.E.2d 633, 637 (1943) (dictum);




sachusetts statute.:' That statute 19 provides that an insurance
contract is an agreement whereby one party, for a consideration,
agrees ". . . to pay money or its equivalent, or to do an act
valuable to the insured, upon the destruction, loss or injury
of something in which the other party has an interest." The
Massachusetts court had earlier stated that this definition is es-
sentially the same as the old common law definition.
20
There are no basic differences between what the courts and the
legislatures regard as insurance. Hence the reasoning which was
applied in attempting to show that the employee welfare plans
under discussion are insurance within the statutory definitions of
that term, (see the Massachusetts definition supra) applies equal-
ly as well here. The conclusion is therefore reached that these
plans are insurance, whether that term is considered within its
statutory meanings or within the meanings attached to it by the
courts.
The courts insist that an insurance contract contain an element
of risk and that the incidence of the risk be shifted to another.
Without these factors, there can be no insurance. 2 ' While it has
been said by some courts that insurance also involves distribution
of risk,2 2 when we come to the question of whether or not an
insurance contract has been written, or an insurance business has
or is being done, in violation of state law, it becomes clear that
distribution of risk involves actuarial rather than legal considera-
tions; for if one individual were to write insurance on another
without being licensed to do so, that should involve a violation
of the insurance law just as much as if many insurance contracts
were issued to many individuals. These observations concerning
17 Candell v. United States, 189 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1951) (dictum);
Maurer v. International Re-Ins. Corp., 31 Del. Ch. 352, 74 A.2d 822, 826
(1950) (dictum); Prader v. National Masonic Acc. Ass'n, 95 Iowa 149, 63
N.W. 601, 602 (1895) (dictum); Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Oliner, 139
Md. 408, 115 Atl. 592, 593 (1921) (dictum); State ex rel. Herbert v.
Standard Oil Co., 138 Ohio St. 376, 35 N.E.2d 437, 440 (1941) (dictum); Denton
v. Ware, 228 S.W.2d 867, 870 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949) (dictum); Shakman v.
United States Credit System Co., 92 Wis. 366, 66 N.W. 528, 531 (1896)
(dictum).
18 Commissioner of Banking and Ins. v. Community Health Service, Inc.,
129 N.J.L. 427, 30 A.2d 44, 46 (1943).
'L9 MAss. Ato. LAWS c. 175, § 2 (1948).
20 Attorney General ex rel. Monk v. C. E. Osgood Co., 249 Mass. 473,
144 N.E. 371, 372 (1924) (dictum).
21 Jordan v. Group Health Ass'n, 107 F.2d 239, 245 (D.C. Cir. 1939)




distribution of risk do not, however, need to obtain in this
situation because obviously in the case of plans such as those
under consideration there is distribution of risk. These additional
requirements are easily satisfied by our joint trusteed union
welfare fund. There is an element of risk involved in the possible
death, injury or illness of an employee or a member of his family;
and the incidence of this risk is shifted from the employee to the
welfare plan; finally, the risk is distributed over all employees
covered by the terms of the agreement establishing the plan.
Now let us look at some particular types of activity which
the courts regard as "insurance" or the doing of an "insurance
business." Contracts providing for burial or funeral benefits,
being determinable upon the cessation of human life and also de-
pendent upon that contingency, are usually regarded as life in-
surance contracts. 3 Associations which issue contracts of this
nature are engaged in the business of life insurance.2-4 Mutual
benefit associations, in most respects, are insurance companies
and the certificates they issue are insurance policies subject to
the insurance laws.25 Accident and death benefit contracts issued
by an association in consideration of the payment of certain dues
are insurance contracts.2 6 A corporation which sells medical pro-
tection against the hazards of injury and illness, and collects a
premium from the purchasers, is performing the functions of
an insurer.2 7 In National Colored Aid Soc'y v. State ex rel.
Wilson, 28 the franchise of a non-profit benevolent association was
forfeited in a suit instituted by the prosecuting attorney for un-
lawfully engaging in the insurance business. The association
23 Commissioner v. W. H. Luquire Burial Ass'n Co., 102 F.2d 89 (5th
Cir. 1939); State ex rel. Landis v. DeWitt C. Jones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147 So.
230 (1933); Benevolent Burial Ass'n, Inc. v. Harrison, 181 Ga. 230, 181 S.E.
829 (1935); State v. Willett, 171 Ind. 296, 86 N.E. 68 (1908); Peterson v.
Smith, 188 Miss. 659, 196 So. 505 (1940); State ex rel. Reece v. Stout, 17
Tenn. App. 10, 65 S.W.2d 827 (1933).
24 Commissioner v. W. H. Luquire Burial Ass'n, Co., 102 F.2d 89 (5th
Cir. 1939); State ex rel. Landis v. DeWitt C. Jones Co., 108 Fla. 613, 147
So. 230 (1933); Benevolent Burial Ass'n Inc. v. Harrison, 181 Ga. 230, 181
S.E. 829 (1935); State ex rel. Dist. Attorney Gen. v. Mutual Mortuary Ass'n
Inc., 166 Tenn. 260, 61 S.W.2d 664 (1933).
25 Sovereign Camp, Woodmen of the World v. Pritchett, 203 Ala. 33,
81 So. 823 (1919); Cosmopolitan Life Ins. Ass'n v. Koegel, 104 Va. 619, 52
S.E. 166, 169 (1905) (dictum); State ex rel. Martin v. Dane County Mut.
Ben. Ass'n, 247 Wis. 220, 19 N.W.2d 303 (1945).
26 International Serv. Union Co. v. People ex rel. Wettengel, 101 Colo.
1, 70 P.2d 431 (1937).
27 McCarty v. King County Medical Serv. Corp., 26 Wash. 2d 660, 175
P2d 653, 666 (1946) (dictum).
28 208 Ind. 380, 196 N.E. 240 (1935).
19563 NOTES
NOTRE DAME LAVYERV.
issued membership certificates which provided for payments to
the designated beneficiary on the death of a member and also
certain disability benefits. Losses incurred were paid from a
mutual fund. The holder of the contract was required to pay
death assessments during the life of the insured. The promised in-
demnity was payable in a lump sum and a definite amount. The
court held the association to be engaged in the life and accident
insurance business.2
In all of the above instances the courts found that the agree-
ments, contracts or certificates were in effect insurance contracts,
and that the associations or companies issuing them were thereby
doing an insurance business. If the courts have little difficulty in
finding that burial and funeral benefit agreements, accident and
sickness agreements, and death benefit contracts, such as those
mentioned above, are insurance contracts, surely it is not un-
reasonable or unwarranted to conclude on that basis that the
courts would have little difficulty in determining that the type of
employee welfare plans being considered here are insurance.
These plans meet every definition, both judicial and statutory,
of an insurance contract and insurance business that has been
propounded. They contain every element or characteristic which
distinguishes insurance contracts from all other types of agree-
ments; the administration of these plans involves the same type
of activity carried on by licensed insurance carriers.
29 One of the most common arguments made in support of the proposi-
tion that, where a trust fund is established and maintained wholly or in
part by contributions of an employer out of which fund benefits are paid to
the employees of that employer on an agreed basis, insurance is not in-
volved because the liability of the trustees is limited to the fund itself.
A corollary argument is that insurance is not involved because there is
no "guaranty" of the payment of the benefits. More particularly, it is pointed
out that, in some instances, for example, pension trusts, the trustees in-
clude in the certificates issued to the employees a provision that their
liability shall be limited to the fund.
This view, even in the case in which there is a provision in the con-
tract that liability is limited to the fund, is palpably unsound as a matter
of law for the reason that, in essential legal terms, the situation there in-
volved is the same as it is in the case of a contract of insurance issued by
an insurance company.
In the first place the identity, in principle, of the situation of the trustees
and the trust fund on the one hand and the insurance company and its
assets on the other is clear because the same contractual elements apply in
both cases; there is an obligation to pay a fixed amount on the part of one
to another upon the occurrence of a fortuitous or*contingent event for
which obligation there is a consideration moving from the employee and the
employer.
In the second place there is a fund standing behind that obligation, in
the case of the trustees the trust fund, in the case of the insurance com-




It is submitted that were a court today presented squarely
with the question: are employee welfare plans, such as those
being considered here, insurance and are the administrators of
these plans carrying on an insurance business, the answer would
be in the affirmative.
George N. Tompkins, Jr.
be insufficient to pay all claims does not alter the insurance nature of the
transaction any more than the fact that the insurance company could be-
come insolvent and not pay later accruing claims in their full amount would
prove that the insurance company was not writing insurance contracts.
In the third place, it can be said that nowhere in the field of insurance
law, or for that matter in the field of the law of contracts in general, can
be found any suggestion that ability to perform, apart from the disabilities
imposed by law, is an essential legal element in the structure of a contract
or one which must be taken into account in the determination of the nature
of that contract. Particularly when viewed in that light, the argument being
considered is obviously wrong.
Finally, in the legal sense neither a life or accident and sickness in-
surance contract nor an annuity contract is a guaranty. It should be ob-
served that an insurance company issues a contract to pay a sum of money.
A guaranty in the law, on the other hand, strictly speaking is an agreement
to pay the debt or discharge the obligation of another made in favor of
a third person (OHendorif Watch Co. v. Pink, 279 N.Y. 32, 17 N.E2d 676,
677 (1938)). Accordingly, the contract of the insurance company in this
respect is identical in principle with the contract issued by the trustees.
From all of this it clearly appears that in all of their essential legal
elements, in terms of whether insurance is involved or not, the contracts
and the surrounding transactions of the trustees of an employee welfare
trust fund and the life insurance, accident and sickness insurance, and an-
nuity contracts issued by an insurance company and the transactions sur-
rounding them are the. same.
19561
